On Sunday, Lebanon will come to a halt for the funeral of Hassan Nasrallah—the longtime iconic leader of Hezbollah—roughly five months after Israel killed him in the southern suburbs of Beirut.
After his assassination on September 27, Nasrallah was buried temporarily next to his son, Hadi, who in 1997 lost his life resisting the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon at the age of 18.
The head of the funeral's organising committee, Hussein Fadlallah, declared that February 23 is “a day the free people of the world will never forget”. In anticipation of a crowd expected to number around 80,000, the funeral will be held at the Camille Chamoun sports stadium. Iran’s top diplomat, Abbas Araghchi, and various leaders from Iran-aligned Iraqi militias are expected to attend this funeral.
Although Lebanon’s President Joseph Aoun will not be one of the attendees, one of his representatives will be there. It is currently unclear whether Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri will attend. But the Amal Movement, which he heads, will. So will the Lebanon-based Syrian Social Nationalist Party and the Lebanese Democrat Party.
Yet, the Future Movement led by Saad Hariri and the right-wing Christian party Lebanese Forces led by Samir Geagea will be absent.
Sunday’s funeral will also commemorate Hashem Safieddine, Nasrallah’s cousin who had served as the head of Hezbollah’s executive council, and was expected to succeed Nasrallah as the group’s secretary-general until Israel killed him in an air raid soon after Nasrallah’s killing.
A challenging environment
This funeral takes place amid a difficult time for Hezbollah. Although Israel’s military failed to start a “post-Hezbollah” era in Lebanon, which is what Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government vowed to do in September, there is no denying that Tel Aviv dealt extremely severe blows to the Iran-backed Shia group.
From the pager and walkie-talkie attacks to the killing of Nasrallah and Safieddine, events of last year were beyond humiliating for Hezbollah and its supporters in Lebanon and elsewhere.
Then, the day of the “ceasefire” between Israel and Hezbollah was when the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led offensive began in northern Syria, resulting in the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime only 11 days later. That was another major loss for Hezbollah, which had long relied on Baathist-ruled Syria as a transit corridor for Iran-sourced weapons to flow into Lebanon.
The killing of Hezbollah’s longtime chief and other high-ranking officials in the organisation as well as Israel’s destruction of much of Hezbollah’s weapons arsenal, the loss of Hezbollah’s partner in Damascus, the rise of new Western- and Saudi-backed leadership in Beirut, and intensified US pressure amid the second Trump presidency shape the difficult landscape for the Lebanese group.
The domestic and regional challenges that Hezbollah must face in this upcoming period are the gravest ones the organisation has faced since Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps established the Lebanese group in 1982.
As established by last year’s US- and French-mediated ceasefire deal, there was an extended deadline for Israel’s military withdrawal from southern Lebanon. That deadline was set for January 26 before being extended to February 18 due to Tel Aviv’s refusal to comply.
But, under the banner of enforcing the “ceasefire” and protecting Israel’s national security from Hezbollah, Israeli invading forces maintain their presence in five strategic hilltop positions in southern Lebanon: Al-Aziyah, Hammams Hill, Awaida Hill, Jabal Balat, and Labouna. Tel Aviv warns that it is fully prepared to resume hostilities.
Lebanon’s Prime Minister Nawaf Salam calls for a total Israeli military withdrawal from his country’s territory. He has correctly declared that those Israeli forces who remain are indeed illegally occupying Lebanese land. But the power imbalance between Lebanon and Israel prevents authorities in Beirut from defending their country’s sovereignty from its aggressive and belligerent neighbour to the south. While the new political leadership in Beirut will seek to secure help from the UN Security Council, this body can never be trusted to act in defense of Lebanon’s sovereignty and security so long as the US, as a permanent member, maintains its veto power.
Washington sees the events that unfolded in Lebanon and Syria last year as providing the West and Israel with a unique opportunity to capitalise on the weakening of Iran’s hand.
Within this context, the Trump administration has been clear about its intention to put the new leadership in Beirut under pressure to keep Hezbollah out of the government and disarm the Iran-backed Shia group.
This message was delivered when US Deputy Special Envoy for the Middle East Morgan Ortagus met with Aoun during her first visit to Lebanon earlier this month. She told the media that she is “not afraid” of Hezbollah “because they've been defeated militarily” and said that Washington’s “red lines” are the Iran-backed organisation being a part of the Lebanese government.
Then, when US Secretary of State Marco Rubio was in Jerusalem as the first leg of his first trip to the Middle East since becoming Washington’s chief diplomat, he called on the Lebanese state to disarm Hezbollah.
Hezbollah’s future
Given all these dynamics, where the current state of affairs in Lebanon and the rest of the Middle East leaves Hezbollah is a key question. The reality is that the weakened group is not in a position to restart a full-blown war with Israel.
Given how much damage the 14 months of warfare in 2023-24 inflicted upon Hezbollah, the pragmatic figures in the organisation understand that at this time it would not be wise to resume such a conflict with Tel Aviv mindful of the guaranteed repercussions.
That said, as some analysts have noted, if this Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon continues, it is likely that eventually, there will be an armed Lebanese resistance to it, even if Hezbollah is not necessarily leading it.
If history is any guide, the indigenous people of southern Lebanon will not tolerate any entrenched Israeli occupation of their land, which would violate the November 2024 ceasefire agreement. Eventually, the Israelis will find that their occupation will backfire when armed resistance resumes, even though it is unclear when, or in what form, that will take place.
At this juncture, Hezbollah is tasked with recalibrating, reorganising, and reassessing its strategies. The mistakes which the group made following the eruption of Israel’s war on Gaza in October 2023 were costly and the Lebanese people suffered greatly as a consequence.
Appointed in late October, Hezbollah’s fourth Secretary-General Naim Qassem has made it clear that the organisation’s policy for now is one of ambiguity, refusing to allow its enemies to know Hezbollah’s next moves. Maintaining manoeuvrability amid these difficult circumstances is key for the group as it seeks to regrow following last year’s devastating losses. Looking ahead, for all the ways in which Hezbollah suffered at the hands of Israel last year, the organisation’s survival underscored the real limits to Tel Aviv’s ability to create changes in Lebanon through brutal warfare.
If the Israelis decide to prolong their occupation of southern Lebanon, that course of action would probably be the factor that leads to a restrengthening of Hezbollah more than anything else.
